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ARISTOTLE’S 
ANALYSIS OF PERCEPTION 
Paolo C. Biondi 
Department of Philosophy 
University of Sudbury, Laurentian University 
RÉSUMÉ : Ce texte examine l’affirmation d’Aristote qui se trouve dans les Seconds Analytiques 
II 19, que la perception porte sur l’universel. L’examen s’effectuera par le biais du De Anima 
II 6 et III 6-8 où Aristote décrit les objets de la perception et de l’intellect. L’auteur soutient 
que selon Aristote, la perception humaine porte toujours sur l’universel contenu dans le parti-
culier parce que l’unité de la substance individuelle est garante de l’unité de l’acte de percep-
tion. Par conséquent, l’analyse en termes de trois objets de perception n’est que le résultat de 
la méthode analytique qu’Aristote emploie afin d’étudier l’acte de perception. 
ABSTRACT : This paper examines Aristotle’s assertion found in Posterior Analytics II 19 that per-
ception is of the universal. Through a study of De Anima II 6 and III 6-8, where Aristotle de-
scribes the objects of perception and of intellect, the author argues that, for Aristotle, human 
perception is always of the universal as it is found in the particular because the unity of the in-
dividual substance guarantees the unity of the act of perception. Consequently, the analysis 
into three perceptible objects is merely the result of Aristotle’s analytical method used to study 
the act of perception. 
______________________  
INTRODUCTION 
n Posterior Analytics (Post An) II 19 Aristotle makes the following enigmatic re-
mark intended to explain the perception of the universal — something that must 
occur if, as he argues, we acquire the principles of scientific knowledge through in-
duction (epagôgê) : “for though the act of perception is of the particular, the capacity 
of perception is of the universal, for example, of man, not of Callias the man” (kai 
gar aisthanetai men to kath’ hekaston, hê d’ aisthêsis tou katholou estin, hoion an-
thrôpou, all’ ou Kalliou anthrôpou).1 How are we to understand this explanatory re-
mark ? 
Some Aristotelian scholars find this explanation inadequate and problematic. An 
examination of several modern-language translations of this statement reveals some 
variety in the way in which scholars establish the relationship between aisthêsis and 
                                       
 1. 100a16-b1 ; my translation. All passages in Greek follow the OCT reading with any variant reading noted. 
English translations, except where otherwise noted, are those from J.L. ACKRILL, ed., A New Aristotle 
Reader, Princeton, Princeton UP, 1987. 
I 
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the perception of universals in terms of object (or content) of perception/capacity (or 
power or faculty) of perception/activity (or act) of perception.2 This diversity in un-
derstanding is evident in another point of divergence regarding aisthêsis : whether 
aisthêsis is held to incorporate a noetic (that is, intellectual) component. This compo-
nent is said by those who do posit it to be ultimately responsible for the perception of 
the universal since sense-perception by means of the external senses alone is incapa-
ble of perceiving anything beyond sensible qualities.3 This, of course, brings us to the 
heart of the debate on Aristotle’s claim cited above. Barnes is representative of those 
who find the orthodox view, with its forced “reconciliation” between an intuitive 
nous and an empirical induction incapable of arriving at the principles of science 
without the assistance of intuition, problematic. He dissolves the problem by saying 
that nous has nothing to do with the inductive method except to satisfy the merely 
terminological question of designating the kind of knowledge present in the state 
(hexis) of possessing the principles of science, which Aristotle says is the result of 
induction.4 In fact, he finds Aristotle’s remark cited above thoroughly unsatisfactory, 
                                       
 2. In English : “for though the act of sense-perception is of the particular, its content is universal” (W. David 
ROSS, ed., The Works of Aristotle Translated into English, London, Oxford University Press, 1910-1952) ; 
“for although you perceive particulars, perception is of universals” (Jonathan BARNES, ed., The Complete 
Works of Aristotle, The Revised Oxford Translation, Princeton, Princeton UP, 1984) ; “for though one 
senses an individual, [the power of] sensation is of the universal” (Hippocrates G. APOSTLE, Aristotle’s 
Posterior Analytics, Iowa, The Peripatetic Press, 1981) ; In French : “car bien que l’acte de perception ait 
pour objet l’individu, la sensation n’en porte pas moins sur l’universel” (Jules TRICOT, Organon : Les Se-
conds Analytiques, nouvelle édition, Paris, Vrin, 1970) ; “et en effet, il est vrai que l’on perçoit l’indivi-
duel, mais la perception porte sur l’universel” (Pierre PELLEGRIN, Seconds Analytiques, Organon IV, Paris, 
Flammarion, 2005) ; In German : “denn man nimmt zwar das Einzelne wahr, die Wahrnehmung geht aber 
auf das Allgemeine [wörtl. : ist vom Allgemeinen]” (Horst SEIDL, Aristoteles Zweite Analytiken, Um-
schlaggestaltung, Bernard Vandemeulebroecke, 1984) ; “denn man nimmt das Einzelne wahr, aber die 
Wahrnehmung geht auf ein allgemeines Objekt” (Eugen ROLFES, Aristoteles Lehre vom Beweis oder 
Zweite Analytik, Hamburg, Felix Meiner Verlag, 1990). 
 3. This is the traditional or orthodox view, where nous is commonly said to function intuitively ; thus nous 
would be translated by ‘intuition’ in English. In addition, this view typically holds that induction requires 
an act of intuition to complete or perfect it, especially in the case of acquiring the principles of science. 
Most Latin medieval commentators of Aristotle held this position, which is still supported by many mod-
ern scholars who follow in the traditions of medieval thinkers. More recently, and outside the scholastic 
tradition, Terence IRWIN, Aristotle’s First Principles, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1988, p. 134-136, argues 
that Aristotle’s “metaphysical realism and his epistemological foundationalism” commit him to “an intui-
tive, non-inferential grasp of first principles.” 
 4. Jonathan BARNES, Posterior Analytics, Second edition, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1994, p. 267-269. There 
have been an increasing number of contemporary scholars who see a variety of problems with the orthodox 
position. The two alluded to above (nous and induction as two distinct and incompatible methods of acqui-
sition ; and the inability of induction to provide principles of science having the requisite character of uni-
versality and necessity) seem to indicate the most significant weaknesses. Among contemporary scholar-
ship, see Jean-Marie LE BLOND, Logique et méthode chez Aristote, Paris, Vrin, 1939 (rpt. 1970), p. 131-140 ; 
James H. LESHER, “The Meaning of NOUS in the Posterior Analytics”, Phronesis, 18 (1973), p. 44-68 ; 
Enrico BERTI, “The Intellection of Indivisibles according to Aristotle”, in G.E.R. LLOYD, G.E.L. OWEN, 
ed., Aristotle on Mind and the Senses, Proceedings of the Seventh Symposium Aristotelicum, Cambridge, 
Cambridge UP, 1978, p. 141-164 ; Charles H. KAHN, “The Role of nous in the Cognition of First Princi-
ples in Posterior Analytics II.19”, in E. BERTI, ed., Aristotle on Science : The Posterior Analytics, Proceed-
ings of the Eighth Symposium Aristotelicum Padova, Padua, Editrice Antenore, 1978, p. 386-414 ; T. ENG-
BERG-PEDERSON, “More on Aristotelian epagôgê”, Phronesis, 24 (1979), p. 301-319 ; Wolfgang WIELAND, 
“Aristotle’s Physics and the Problem of Inquiry into Principles”, in J. BARNES, M. SCHOFIELD, R. SORABJI, 
ed., Articles on Aristotle, Vol. I, Science, London, Duckworth, 1979, p. 127-140 ; Lambros COULOUBARIT-
SIS, “Y a-t-il une intuition des principes chez Aristote ?”, Revue Internationale de Philosophie, 34, 133-134  
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accusing Aristotle of not providing anywhere in his extant corpus an account of how 
such universal concepts as man can be “derived from the data of perception” (p. 266). 
I, however, contend that an account can be constructed on behalf of Aristotle so 
that the above remark can be seen to offer a solid explanation of Aristotle’s position 
that we come to acquire “the primary principles through induction ; for even sense-
perception implants the universal this way” (100b3-5 ; my translation). In agreement 
with Modrak, I think that we must refer to Aristotle’s psychological treatises 
(De Anima [DA] and the Parva Naturalia [PN]) to understand Post An II 19.5 A full 
account would require a thorough study of the psychological treatises in order to see 
how Aristotle describes such things as sense-perception, images and imagination 
(phantasia), memory (mnêmê), and the intellect (nous). I will limit myself to only one 
of the elements of such an account : a study of the objects of perception as described 
in DA II 6. Furthermore, I contend that nous plays a very significant role in the in-
ductive process and is not a mere “term of art”6 having almost nothing to do with the 
sense-perception involved in induction. To demonstrate this point I will analyze DA 
III 6-8, which treats of the indivisible objects of the intellect, as well as a few other 
related DA passages. 
In the course of this study I will argue in the main for the conclusion that human 
perception is always of the universal as it is found in the particular because the unity 
of the individual substance guarantees the unity of the act of perception, which is a 
joint activity of the senses and the intellect. Consequently, Aristotle’s analysis into 
three perceptible objects is merely the result of his analytical method used to study 
the act of perception. The study will first focus on the three objects of perception 
outlined in DA II 6 and then on the two indivisible objects of the intellect described in 
III 6-8. However, secondary to the main argument I will answer concerns expressed 
by Barnes and others regarding the lack of textual evidence in Aristotle’s writings re-
quired to explain the perception of universals as well as the troublesome nous/epagô-
gê relationship. To better situate the study of the objects of perception in Post An 
II 19, I wish to make some preliminary comments about the broader context of this 
significant chapter. 
                                       
(1980), p. 345-372 ; and Deborah K.W. MODRAK, Aristotle : The Power of Perception, Chicago, London, 
The University of Chicago Press, 1987, p. 157-179. 
 5. MODRAK, Power of Perception, p. 9, 19, and 157-158. In a brief paper such as this, it is not possible to 
treat of the debate over the place of DA and how it relates to Aristotle’s other works, especially the PN and 
his biological writings. I am sympathetic to a more charitable reading which sees Aristotle’s corpus as pre-
senting a relatively coherent and consistent philosophy. For the reader interested in seeing one attempt at a 
charitable reading, see Abraham P. BOS, The Soul and Its Instrumental Body, Leiden, Brill, 2003. This 
work also provides an extensive review of the secondary literature on the topic. 
 6. BARNES, Posterior Analytics, p. 266. Note that Barnes’ label “term of art” is applied to ‘intuition’ as the 
traditional translation of nous, hence not directly to the term nous. 
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I. CONTEXT : DEMONSTRATION AND PLATO 
Post An II 19 is the final chapter of a treatise whose main concern is the exami-
nation of the nature of syllogistic reasoning and of scientific knowledge (epistêmê), 
which for Aristotle, means examining demonstration since scientific knowledge is 
expressed in demonstrative form.7 Throughout Post An Aristotle discusses the nature 
and properties of the principles (archai) of demonstration, which are required for 
generating scientific knowledge.8 However, nowhere does he talk about how they are 
acquired apart from making the remark (in I 2) that there must be a kind of knowl-
edge that is “other than scientific knowledge”9 and (in I 3) that there can be no dem-
onstration of the premises of demonstration — if one wants to avoid either an infinite 
regress in demonstrations or a circular form of demonstration. Post An II 19 thus has 
the likely purpose of showing, albeit very briefly, how principles of science can be 
acquired and how this acquisition is non-demonstrative in character. 
Assuming that this is the appropriate context, it will be worth noting, firstly, that 
the hexis of nous, the cognitive state of possessing the principles of demonstration, is 
introduced in II 19 because of a lack in the cognitive state of science : due to the fact 
that the demonstrative method requires principles that are themselves indemonstrable, 
Aristotle brings into service nous. Whatever else may be said regarding the meaning 
and function of nous, it is not to be understood as being introduced due to a defect in 
the inductive process through sense-perception described in II 19, namely, that sense-
perception by itself cannot provide universal knowledge. The raison d’être of nous in 
this chapter is to be found in the nature of science, not in that of induction.10 Sec-
ondly, once this is granted, the purpose of the chapter can be seen to lie in showing 
how the indemonstrable principles of science are themselves acquired by means of an 
examination of the acquisition of a noetic state of possession of these principles. The 
non-demonstrative method of induction from sense-perception is then presented as 
Aristotle’s answer as to how such an acquisition can take place. Thus, the third and 
final point to keep in mind is that the method of induction itself is subordinate to nous 
and finds its raison d’être in the noetic state, for it is presented in order to explain the 
generation of this non-demonstrative cognitive state of mind. Furthermore, induction 
                                       
 7. BARNES, Posterior Analytics, p. 271, finds the placement of II 19 a rather obscure point and even suggests 
that it may be an addendum inserted by later editors unsure of where to place it in the Analytics. Though it 
may be difficult to determine the placement of II 19 with any certainty, I am not inclined to think of it as a 
later addendum due to the allusions to the topic of the principles of science found elsewhere in Post An. 
 8. See especially I 2, 72a5-24 ; I 3, 72b18-25 ; and I 4-10. 
 9. L. Aryeh KOSMAN, “Understanding, Explanation, and Insight in the Posterior Analytics”, in E.N. LEE, 
A.P.D. MOURELATOS, R.M. RORTY, ed., Exegesis and Argument, Phronesis, Supplementary Volume I, 
Assen, Van Gorcum, 1973, p. 382-384, notes the ambiguity of the phrase, heteros esti tou epistasthai tro-
pos (71b16), which could either mean another form of or a form other than epistêmê. Both meanings, I 
contend, may be seen to apply to nous as the principles of science in the following manner : insofar as the 
principles are not demonstrative in character, they are other than scientific knowledge ; insofar as scientific 
knowledge requires scientific principles, they may be considered another form of science. 
 10. IRWIN, Aristotle’s First Principles, p. 134-136, makes it clear that Aristotle’s “conception of demonstration 
embodies a foundationalist conception of justification,” and this requirement can only be met if Aristotle 
“recognizes self-evident first principles grasped by intuition” [emphasis added]. 
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is nearly identical to sense-perception, as evidenced by Aristotle’s remark stating that 
we know the principles through induction because sense-perception implants the uni-
versal in this way.11 
Another important contextual item to keep in mind is Plato, especially his views 
on reminiscence (or recollection) of intelligible Forms which already exist in each 
person’s soul (or mind) though one may not be aware of them. Many scholars see 
lines 99b25-27 as an allusion to Plato and II 19 as a response to him.12 The dilemma 
presented in the Meno, that is, the apparent impossibility of acquiring knowledge or 
learning, is on Aristotle’s mind in the opening chapter of Post An. A part of his an-
swer to this dilemma is contained in II 19 and constitutes a criticism of Plato’s views. 
As these views are expressed in the Meno and the Phaedo, it is clear that Aristotle 
does not think that the body and its senses are generally an obstacle to the soul or that 
sense-perception can, at most, merely stimulate the recollection of Forms. It is also 
plausible to see Aristotle’s stages leading to knowledge of the universal through vari-
ous kinds of sense cognition as an alternative to the line analogy of the Republic (VI, 
509d ff) whereby Plato opposes and keeps separate on one hand, beliefs and opinions 
based on sense cognition and on the other hand, knowledge based on the intellectual 
perception of and dialectical reasoning with intelligible Forms. In short, Aristotle 
finds Plato’s description of human perception and scientific knowledge problematic 
for several reasons, some of which are implicit or explicit in II 19 as well as in other 
passages of Post An (not to mention other treatises).13 
Aristotle’s way of dealing with some of the difficulties is, basically, to substitute 
the universal for Forms. He affirms we can have scientific knowledge by simply pos-
iting the universal.14 Aristotle readjusts the metaphysical balance by considering sen-
sible individuals, rather than intelligible Forms, substantial and making universals 
subordinate to them as predicates : the individual man is called a primary substance ; 
the universal (for instance, the species human being and genera such as animal and 
body) is called a secondary substance, and this substance is said of primary sub-
stances.15 On the relationship of predication (that is, something’s being said of some 
subject), he writes : “Now of actual things some are universal, others particular (I call 
universal that which is by its nature predicated of a number of things, and particular 
                                       
 11. Thus, the orthodox view is correct in seeing nous as closely related to induction ; however, Barnes and the 
other critics noted above in n. 4 are right in finding the traditional explanation of this relationship problem-
atic and unsatisfactory in some respects. 
 12. See W. David ROSS, Aristotle’s Prior and Posterior Analytics, Revised text, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 
1949 (rpt. 1957), p. 677, who points out as well a parallel in thought between lines 100a6-7 and Plato’s 
Phaedo 96b. My intention in what follows is to sketch a plausible account of Aristotle’s understanding of 
Plato’s views, without suggesting thereby that these are in fact Plato’s views. 
 13. For a discussion of some of the problems, see, for example, Harold F. CHERNISS, Aristotle’s Criticism of 
Plato and the Academy, Baltimore, Johns Hopkins Press, 1944 ; and cf. Lloyd P. GERSON, Aristotle and 
Other Platonists, Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 2005. 
 14. So CHERNISS, Aristotle’s Criticism of Plato, p. 71-72 and 235-239, but not GERSON, Aristotle and Other 
Platonists, p. 76-85. See Post An I 11, 77a5-9 and note the similarity in wording used to describe the uni-
versal in these lines with the phrasing of II 19, 100a7-8. 
 15. Categories 2, 1a20-b8 and 5, in toto. 
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that which is not ; man, for instance, is a universal, Callias a particular).”16 With these 
modifications to Plato’s stance, it should be easier to understand why Aristotle thinks 
the principles of demonstration must be acquired from induction through sense-
perception of particulars.17 
II. THE THREE OBJECTS OF SENSE-PERCEPTION 
In DA II 6, Aristotle recognizes three objects of sense-perception. The description 
or definition of each of these objects is determined relative to the external senses. 
Perception is said to be a kind of alteration undergone by the percipient subject (DA 
II 5, 416b34) as its sense organs are moved and affected by sensible qualities in the 
environment. Most of these sensible qualities are familiar to us and are commonly 
divided according to the five external senses of sight, hearing, smell, taste, and 
touch : sight sees colours, hearing hears sounds, and so on. However, Aristotle’s 
method of analysis of sensible objects takes as its point of reference whether and how 
sensible objects stimulate the external senses into activity, that is, whether and how 
they are perceptible to them. According to this analytical approach, an object which is 
in itself perceptible to any external sense is said to be sensible per se, or essentially 
perceptible (kath’ hauto), while one which is not itself perceptible to an external 
sense but nonetheless accompanies, or is a concomitant of, a per se sensible object is 
said to be accidentally sensible (kata sumbebêkos). The inclusion of the second cate-
gory of objects may seem odd. After all, why include items that are not at all percep-
tible to the external senses in a list of perceptible objects ? Yet, as I hope to show, it 
is highly significant and extremely pertinent to a proper understanding of the II 19 
passage under examination. 
Regarding the sensible per se, Aristotle subdivides these objects into two classes : 
proper (or special) objects (ta idia) and common objects (ta koina) (418a9-10). The 
proper objects include the various sensible qualities : colours (and light), sounds, 
smells, flavours, and tactile qualities. As for the common objects, Aristotle recog-
nizes six of them : movement and rest, size (or magnitude or extension) and shape (or 
figure), number (i.e., multiplicity or plurality) and unity.18 The two classes of objects 
                                       
 16. On Interpretation (On Int) 7, 17a37-b1. Notice the example : it is identical to the one found in the II 19 
passage under examination. 
 17. For the purposes of my argument, the primacy of the numerically individual substance is essential and is 
assumed in the argumentation. To defend this assumption is not possible given the constraints ; however, 
the reader must be made aware of the debate over what, for Aristotle, is the primary substance : is it the in-
dividual substance, which is usually construed as a synthesis of matter and form ? Or is it the form itself ? 
And if it is the form, is it the specific or the particular form ? Montgomery FURTH, Substance, Form and 
Psyche : an Aristotelian Metaphysics, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1988, offers an interesting 
and promising account in which the numerical individual (Callias) and its specific form (man) can both be 
substance because an individual can only exist as a specific kind of individual. As will be seen, my expla-
nation of the act of perception will similarly emphasize perceiving the individual as an individual of a spe-
cific kind (in my terminology, the individual as a whole). For a different account, cf. IRWIN, Aristotle’s 
First Principles, p. 73-116, 199-276. 
 18. DA II 6, 418a17-18 lists five objects, but DA III 1, 425a15-16 adds unity (hen) as well. The list in three 
pairs is intended to show how common objects can be paired in terms of the contraries unlimited and limit,  
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are distinguished according to whether an object can be perceived by other senses or 
not. In other words, some objects can be perceived by only one external sense 
(418a11-12). These are the proper objects. Other objects can be perceived by more 
than one sense, in fact, by all of them in common (418a18-19). These are the com-
mon objects.19 For example, the proper object of sight is colour (and light) since no 
other external sense can perceive the various colours. But other sensible features such 
as the size or the shape of the patch of colour can be perceived by other external 
senses besides sight. For instance, though I could discern the size and rectangular 
shape of a book cover by simply looking at the colour of it, I could also discern those 
same qualities by touch, by running my hand over the edges of the book cover while 
my eyes are shut. 
There are several further characteristics concerning these objects that are worth 
noting. Regarding special objects, it is impossible for an external sense to be deceived 
about the perception of its special object (418a14-16). Sight, while seeing, cannot be 
mistaken about perceiving colour or the fact that there is colour ; however, it can be 
mistaken about such things as what the coloured thing is or where it is located.20 Aris-
totle regards the special objects as objects of perception properly speaking ; it is to 
these that each external sense is naturally relative (418a24-25). It can be said that 
there is a relationship of reciprocal exclusion between proper object and capacity, that 
is, the sense capacity is such that it can only perceive this object, and the object is 
such that it can only be sensed by this capacity. 
This is not the case for common objects. By referring to them as common, Aris-
totle wishes to indicate that they are common to all the external senses because they 
are perceptible to them all and to no one in particular. The senses can make many er-
rors in perceiving them because these objects do not have a natural correspondence or 
fit to any one of the external senses (DA III 1, 425a30-b4). These objects are also 
more subject to circumstances ; for instance, as one approaches a patch of green that 
is seen from a distance, it will appear to become larger in size and its shape might al-
                                       
respectively. Georges RODIER, Aristote. Traité de l’âme, Tome II, Paris, Ernest Leroux, 1900, p. 263, does 
not include unity, though I think it ought to be included because it is the contrary of number. W. David 
ROSS, Aristotle De Anima, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1961, p. 33, includes time among the common ob-
jects, citing PN 451a17 and 452b7-9 in support. Robert D. HICKS, Aristotle : De Anima, Cambridge, 1907 
(rpt. Amsterdam, Adolf M. Hakkert Publisher, 1965), p. LII and 362, does too. I, however, hesitate to in-
clude it among the objects of perception because the perception of time does not seem to be perceptible to 
the external senses like the other common objects are, requiring instead a perception of the percipient’s 
own perceptual activity. 
 19. There is some difficulty in seeing how the common objects can be perceptible to all of the external senses 
as Aristotle claims. For instance, how can we smell the shape of pepper ? It would have been much easier 
to accept if Aristotle had merely claimed that a common object is one that is perceptible to at least any two 
external senses. RODIER, Traité de l’âme, p. 263, reports that the ancient commentators unanimously 
maintained that the common objects are not in fact perceptible to all the senses. HICKS, De Anima, p. 362, 
simply remarking that “all the senses, in various combinations, at one time or another contribute to make 
them known,” does not offer us much assistance. 
 20. In a person with daltonism, colour blindness is due to a defective organ, to the material substrate ; the 
power of sight, the ability to see tout court, still sees colours. In other words, we must distinguish the psy-
chological power from the material substrate, the physiological organ, and recognize their respective roles 
in perception. 
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ter and become more definite. In human beings sight and touch seem to be relied 
upon most in the perception of common objects, though paradoxically enough, sight 
is most easily duped by optical illusions of all sorts.21 Aristotle claims that common 
objects are perceived by the external senses by means of the special objects and 
movement (DA III 1, 425a16-20). For instance, in discriminating the size and shape 
of a book cover my eyes must scan the coloured surface of the book’s cover and my 
hand must run along its edges.22 This necessary connection with a proper object 
makes the common object perceptible per se and not accidentally perceptible, even 
though no common object is proper to any one sense. Aristotle suggests that the rea-
son we have more than one external sense is to help us distinguish proper from com-
mon sensible objects, for common objects always accompany proper objects, and by 
accompanying more than one proper object, we are eventually able to notice that the 
shape of the colour (rather, the coloured surface) is distinguishable from the colour 
itself (DA III 1, 425b4-11). 
To sum up, special objects designate sensible qualities, whereas common objects 
designate quantitative attributes present in sensible things. Since both kinds of per-
ceptible object are essentially perceptible to the external senses, the perception of 
them enables us, as percipient subjects, to perceive things in their phenomenal aspect. 
We capture the appearances of things even though we do not yet know what they are, 
that is, what kind of substances they are, or what their essential natures are. Yet as 
human beings, we do claim to see the son of Cleon standing by a column in the agora 
talking with Callias the man. How can such acts of perception so evident in our ordi-
nary language be explained ?23 
Aristotle’s explanation is grounded in his recognition of the accidentally percep-
tible object as a third object of perception (418a20-23). Ultimately (as will be shown 
in the next section), this object refers to the substantial nature, the essence, of things 
present in sensible reality. In other words, Aristotle is suggesting to us that non-
sensible things referred to and signified by a universal such as the species man or the 
genus animal have an objective basis just as much as sensible qualities and quantita-
tive attributes do. Thus, when I see a given patch of white, which is both a special 
and a common object essentially sensible to my external senses, I also ‘see’ the sub-
stance of this patch of white, which is not per se perceptible to my external senses but 
rather accidentally perceptible to them. Of course, we might wonder what in the per-
                                       
 21. The paradox is noted because sight provides us with even more sensory information than touch ; see PN 1, 
437a6-9 and Metaphysics (Meta) I 1, 980a25-27. AQUINAS, In Metaphysicam Aristotelis Commentaria. 
Editio tertia, Turin, Marietti, 1920, I.1.8, tells us why human beings rely on these two senses most : it is 
that visual and tactile qualities adhere closely to the thing to which they belong. 
 22. Sometimes the movement is in the object and not in the percipient subject ; for example, hearing the sound 
a passing car makes requires following the motion of the car (the Doppler effect) rather than moving my 
ear alongside a stationary car ! 
 23. I am aware that perceiving phenomena requires unifying into a single image the perceptual data acquired 
discretely through each of the external senses. For the moment I wish to leave aside any question concern-
ing the acts of perception and discrimination required on the side of the perceiving subject in order to focus 
strictly on the side of the perceptible objects. The next section will take up some of the questions regarding 
the percipient’s activity. 
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cipient actually perceives this object if not the external senses. But leaving this ques-
tion about the perceiving subject aside for now, what else can be said about the acci-
dentally perceptible object ? 
Hicks advises us that if we want to understand the full import of Aristotle’s dis-
tinction between essential and accidental perception, “we must enlarge our notion of 
sumbebêkos.”24 He says, in Aristotle’s writings, a quality or attribute is usually said to 
be an accident (sumbebêkos) of, or to belong to, a thing or substance. This meaning 
of sumbebêkos is a result of Aristotle’s doctrine that qualities, attributes, and proper-
ties do not exist independently of the things or substances in which they inhere. But, 
Hicks adds, the meaning of sumbainein (the verbal form of sumbebêkos) is simply to 
go with or to accompany something. Thus, in the context of the three perceptible ob-
jects, these words are used to denote the thing or substance which goes with or ac-
companies its essentially perceptible objects. I see the white shape essentially ; the 
man Callias, the substance to which this white shape belongs, I perceive accidentally 
because the individual substance is regarded as a concomitant of the white shape. In 
the course of his examination of sumbebêkos, Hicks asks an important question : 
“What, then, exactly, is perceived, the qualities and attributes, or the things to which 
they belong ?” He thinks that, properly speaking, the quality or attribute is perceived 
“directly”, but Aristotle’s metaphysical doctrine regarding the impossibility of acci-
dents existing independently of the substances in which they inhere compels him to 
find a way to rank substance as an object of perception perceived “indirectly”. I think 
Hicks’ analysis is acceptable so far as it goes ; however, I would like to expand on 
and modify it. 
We ought to distinguish between perceptual priority and metaphysical (or onto-
logical) priority. Perceptual priority is gained from the perspective of the percipient 
and takes as the point of reference what is perceptible to the subject’s external senses. 
From this standpoint, the proper sensible objects are prior because they are the prop-
erly sensible objects relative to the external senses. The common sensible objects can 
be said to be equally prior in as much as they too are essentially perceptible ; how-
ever, in so far as they do not fit any of the external senses and depend on the special 
objects’ being in motion, they can be considered somewhat posterior to the proper 
objects. Finally, the accidentally perceptible substantial or essential nature comes last 
because this object merely accompanies the essentially perceptible objects without 
being perceived by the external senses at all. 
Metaphysical priority takes as its point of reference substance, especially the in-
dividual and numerically one substance, which is neither in a subject nor said of a 
subject. It offers the objective perspective. The individual substance is thus meta-
physically prior to the individual accident, which is said to be in a subject and cannot 
exist or have its being separated from the substance in which it inheres, as Hicks 
notes. Furthermore, metaphysical priority grounds perceptual priority in the sense 
that individual accidents include sensible qualities (special objects) and quantitative 
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attributes (common objects), and these can only exist in individual substances. In 
addition, individual substances are said to be primary substances because, among 
“actual things,” they are logically prior to secondary substances, species and genera, 
which are not in primary substances but are said of them. With species and genera we 
reach the universals plausibly referred to in II 19, for they provide the concepts which 
can be used as matter to generate scientific knowledge and explanations (scientific 
definitions, scientific propositions, and demonstrations) of the essential nature of 
individual substances. 
In other words, Aristotle is not saying that human perception is of three distinct 
objects, as if each of these objects is capable of existing separately in extra-mental 
reality like substantially separate and independently existing individual things. 
Rather, from the objective perspective offered by the metaphysical standpoint, what 
exists first and foremost in reality is the individual substance, and this has sensible 
qualities and quantitative attributes (both accidents) as well as an essential nature 
(substance). It is possible to analyze an individual substance in terms of its substance 
and its accidents just as it is possible to analyze it in terms of its matter and form. But 
such distinctions are the result of an intellectual analysis of an indivisible ontological 
unit, a single entity or a single being. Similarly, it is possible to analyze the individual 
substance considered as something with the potential to be perceived into objects of 
perception by taking the external senses as the standard used to distinguish these ob-
jects. But it must never be forgotten that these objects are the result of an intellectual 
analysis. Ultimately, the object of perception is the reality itself, the individual sub-
stance as a whole. Therefore, in answer to Hicks’ question regarding what is per-
ceived, the thing or the qualities and attributes of the thing, the correct answer, it 
would seem, is the contrary to his. It is first and foremost the individual substantial 
thing that is perceived in sense-perception. 
In order to understand this answer, it is necessary to acknowledge several points. 
First of all, the fact that Aristotle includes among the objects of perception an aspect 
of the individual substance which is not at all perceptible to the external senses sug-
gests two correlative points : (1) the individual substance is not exhausted by its phe-
nomenal appearance ; and (2), the percipient must have another perceptive capacity if 
it is going to perceive this non-sensible aspect. Secondly, the fact that Aristotle in-
cludes an accidentally perceptible object suggests that the analysis of the objects of 
perception in DA II 6 remains incomplete. If the substantial nature of an individual 
substance is not perceptible to the external senses, then not only must it be percepti-
ble to another perceptual capacity, it must be essentially perceptible to it. For that 
which is accidental must be reduced to something essential.25 Thirdly, if we want to 
discover what this other perceptual ability could be, then it would seem necessary for 
us to change the standard used to distinguish the objects of perception. Rather than 
taking the external senses, I propose that we take nous, the intellect, as the new stan-
dard. For with nous as the measure, the substance and essential nature of the individ-
                                       
 25. ARISTOTLE does this in Physics II 5-6, where he reduces chance and spontaneity as accidental causes to the 
moving cause, which is an essential cause of things that come to be for some end. See especially 198a1-10. 
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ual substance becomes the essentially perceptible object, while the individual thing’s 
sensible qualities and quantitative attributes become accidentally perceptible objects 
(as will be shown shortly). Besides, in II 19, Aristotle does explicitly say that a state 
of nous is developed by means of induction through sense-perception. Let us examine 
the implications of this shift. 
III. THE TWO INDIVISIBLE OBJECTS OF NOUS 
It is in DA III 4-5 that we find Aristotle’s thoughts on nous as intellective capac-
ity of the soul. DA III 6-8 adds further points about aisthêsis and nous, including 
some remarks about how the activity of nous is not possible without the use of sen-
sory images. There are three points I would like to establish by examining these 
texts : (1) that the substantial nature of individual substances is indeed the essentially 
perceptible object of nous ; (2) that this object exists, at least potentially, in the phe-
nomenal appearances acquired through the external senses’ per se perception of the 
proper and common sensible objects ; and (3) that the individual substance but per-
ceived as a whole, that is, from the perspective of its universal essential nature, is the 
main object of sense-perception, which is the joint activity of the intellect and the 
sense capacities. 
Aristotle agrees with Plato’s description of the soul as the place of forms ; how-
ever, he restricts this to the intellective capacity of the soul and further stipulates that 
the soul is only potentially, not actually, the forms (DA III 4, 429a27-29). In the fa-
mous chapters III 4-5, Aristotle explains how the intellect must have a receptive ca-
pacity in order to receive its intelligible object as well as a productive or an actualiz-
ing capacity in order to make that which is potentially intelligible into an actually 
intelligible object. The object of the intellect (to noêma) itself is then described in 
III 6.26 The intelligible object is said to be that which is indivisible (to adiaireton) 
(430a26). From Aristotle’s presentation, it can be seen that there are two kinds of in-
divisible object, and that the indivisible object can be either potentially indivisible or 
actually indivisible. 
Taking the potential/actual distinction first, a potentially indivisible object would 
be exemplified by a line. A line is a continuous length that is actually indivisible, but 
it still retains the potential to be divided because it can be cut into segments. That 
which is potentially indivisible, on the contrary, is something that is not only actually 
indivisible but also potentially not divisible (a-diaireton) because it is not capable of 
                                       
 26. This chapter contains several exegetical obstacles, making common agreement on certain details difficult. 
My account will focus on elucidating only those features that will help to establish the three points I am 
concerned with in this section. Those interested in pursuing a more detailed analysis of the chapter are in-
vited to see BERTI, “The Intellection of Indivisibles”, in Aristotle on Mind and the Senses, p. 141-164 ; 
Thomas DE KONINCK, “La noêsis et l’indivisible selon Aristote”, in J.-F. MATTÉI, ed., La naissance de la 
raison en Grèce, Actes du Congrès de Nice, mai 1987, Paris, PUF, 1990, p. 215-228 ; Enrico BERTI, “Re-
considérations sur l’intellection des ‘indivisibles’ selon Aristote, De Anima, III, 6”, p. 391-404 ; Mario 
MIGNUCCI, “Vérité et pensée”, p. 405-422 ; and Michel FATTAL, “L’intellection des indivisibles dans le 
De Anima (III, 6) d’Aristote. Lectures arabes et modernes”, p. 423-440, all three found in G. ROMEYER 
DHERBEY, C. VIANO, ed., Corps et âme : Sur le De Anima d’Aristote, Paris, Vrin, 1996. 
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being divided at all. A point would be an example of this. Aristotle’s point, it seems, 
is that some intelligible objects are of things that are thought of as being actually in-
divisible, though nothing prevents that thing from being divided, whereas other intel-
ligible objects are of things that are thought of as being actually indivisible and must 
necessarily be so thought because they can never be divided or else can only be di-
vided accidentally (that is, not essentially). 
As for the two kinds of indivisible object recognized by Aristotle in this chapter, 
they may be designated by the labels ‘simple’ and ‘synthetic’ (or ‘composite’).27 The 
difference between the two can be explained as follows : the simple indivisible object 
indicates a thought of something that is one and undivided in some way or other ; it is 
a thought of something without combining it with the thought of something else. The 
synthetic indivisible object refers to a combining of two thoughts of two separate 
things into one thought as a unity of the two things. Among the simple indivisible 
intelligible objects, Aristotle includes the thought of an actually undivided quantity, 
the thought of the actually undivided form of a thing,28 and the thought of the point 
and any other things that are completely indivisible (that is, not even potentially di-
visible). The synthetic indivisible refers to the thought of any statement or proposi-
tion in which something is said of something else. 
In the course of his analysis of the two kinds of indivisible object, Aristotle ex-
plains the characteristics of the thought in each of the cases, emphasizing the fact that 
the thought of any indivisible intelligible object occurs in an undivided time. In the 
case of thoughts about statements, which can be about past, present, or future states 
of affairs, Aristotle claims that the temporal component is also thought of and added 
into the composite thought : “And that which produces a unity is in each case the in-
tellect” (to de hen poioun, touto ho nous hekaston) (430b5-6). One significant differ-
ence between simple and synthetic indivisible objects concerns their truth value. In 
the case of synthetic thought, there is both truth and falsity, for the combining of 
thoughts to form a unity in a statement can be true or false. Assuming Cleon is in fact 
white, then the statement ‘Cleon is white’ will be true, while saying ‘Cleon is brown’ 
will be false. This is not how it is with the simple indivisible object of thought. There 
is no falsity possible in such thoughts. In the case of the thought of “what a thing is in 
respect of ‘what it is for it to be what it was’” (ho tou ti esti kata to ti ên einai), Aris-
totle maintains that it is a true thought (430b27-29). Moreover, whenever there is a 
thought of things which are without matter, the thought, says Aristotle, is true just 
                                       
 27. The synthetic object is described at 430a26-b6 and the simple at 430b6-30. My position on the nature of 
these objects is similar to the one expressed by FATTAL, “L’intellection des indivisibles”, in ROMEYER 
DHERBEY, C. VIANO, ed., Corps et âme. 
 28. I read the sentence which concerns the form (to mê kata poson adiaireton alla tôi eidei noei) at l. 430b14-
15, contrary to Bywater’s recommendation to place it in the midst of 430b20. My understanding of the 
reference to form as an indivisible object of thought, at least for the purposes of clarifying the passage from 
Post An II 19, will be clarified below. 
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like the external senses which are never mistaken with respect to their special objects 
(430b29-30).29 
From these passages, it should be evident that, according to Aristotle, the intellect 
has the essential nature of things as its proper object since this is what the form of a 
thing is (the to ti ên einai) and the intellect cannot be mistaken in its perception of it. 
Moreover, there is even a clear assertion about intellect being responsible for pro-
ducing the unity of statements, which would therefore include statements regarding 
the forms of things. Both of these points are directly relevant to the context of Post 
An II 19. The implication to be drawn is that the hexis of nous requires the possession 
of both kinds of indivisible object of thought, for the perception of the essence of in-
dividual substances can assist in arriving at a definition of the essence of the things 
under examination in a given science, that is, assist in acquiring a scientific definition 
of the subject of the science ; and the production of propositions which predicate the 
essential properties and the causes of the subject of the science assist in arriving at 
demonstrations of the cause of the inherence of essential properties in this subject. 
This is not to suggest that nous can acquire definitions and some propositions useful 
for demonstrations without any sort of discursive activity whatsoever ; rather, what I 
am saying is that nous can grasp the essence as it is better known to us through the 
senses. An understanding of the essence through rational processes such as defining 
by means of the genus and differentia(e), or through demonstration, would constitute 
the kind of knowledge that is prior and more familiar by nature or absolutely 
(haplôs). But this rational understanding relies upon the indemonstrable (or ‘non-
rational’) understanding of that which is better known to the senses and is guided by 
it.30 
Describing this view in terms of the perceptible objects, my claim is that the in-
tellect’s essential perception of the essence can and must be connected with the ex-
ternal senses’ essential perception of the proper and common perceptible objects. For 
this is how we know the essence in relation to us and through our senses. And if this 
is so, then the intellect must initially perceive this kind of indivisible object in the 
sensory image ; in other words, the universal essence must potentially be in such an 
image. This brings us to the second point I seek to establish, namely that the substan-
tial nature of individual substances, the intellect’s proper object, exists potentially in 
                                       
 29. ARISTOTLE’s thoughts on the two kinds of indivisible object of thought found in DA III 6 should be supple-
mented by his views found in On Int 1, Meta VI 4 and Meta IX 10 where there are similar discussions of 
two objects of thought and of truth and falsity. For examples of such an examination, compare MIGNUCCI, 
“Vérité et pensée”, in ROMEYER DHERBEY, C. VIANO, ed., Corps et âme, p. 405-422, and HICKS, 
De Anima, p. 511-513. 
 30. This is how I think can be applied in the context of II 19 ARISTOTLE’s doctrine regarding the two meanings 
of the phrase ‘prior and more familiar’ ; on the doctrine, see Post An I 2, 71b33-72a5 and I 3, 72b25-32. 
That which is prior and more familiar to us is the non-demonstrable understanding provided by perception 
of sensible particulars known through induction. This understanding then enables us to acquire that which 
is prior and more familiar absolutely, which is an understanding by means of universal knowledge and re-
quires reasoning. This, I think, sufficiently establishes the fact that nous has some part to play in the acqui-
sition of the principles of science contra BARNES, Posterior Analytics, p. 268-269, for instance, who trivi-
alizes Aristotle’s choice of the word nous in II 19. 
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the images acquired through the external senses’ per se perception of the proper and 
common sensible objects. 
Turning to DA III 7-8, it is possible to glean Aristotle’s position regarding this 
matter. He maintains, “[t]o the thinking soul images serve as sense-perceptions […]. 
Hence the soul never thinks without an image” (noei aneu phantasmatos hê psuchê) 
(431a14-17). “That which can think, therefore, thinks the forms in the images […]” 
(ta men oun eidê to noêtikon en tois phantasmasi noei) (431b2). According to Aris-
totle, no actual thing has an existence apart from magnitudes (oude pragma outhen 
esti para ta megethê) — that is, all things that exist must be an empirical reality or 
have a sensible component31 ; consequently, “[…] the objects of thought are included 
among the forms which are objects of perception […]” (en tois eidesi tois aisthêtois 
ta noêta esti) (432a3-5). While raising a question about how the first thoughts (ta 
prôta noêmata) are distinguishable from images, Aristotle replies that no first 
thoughts, nor any other thoughts, are images, even though they will not exist without 
images (432a12-14). Finally, he asserts : “And for this reason unless one perceived 
things one would not learn or understand anything, and when one contemplates one 
must simultaneously contemplate an image ; for images are like sense-perceptions, 
except that they are without matter” (hotan te theôrêi, anankê hama phantasma ti 
theôrein· Ta gar phantasmata hôsper aisthêmata esti, plên aneu hulês) (432a8-10).32 
From these many affirmations, Aristotle’s position is clear. The obstacle we may 
have is in understanding or explaining it. One way to explain it is to make reference 
to the indivisible objects of nous. Among the simple indivisible objects, we saw that 
Aristotle includes the actually indivisible quantity and the undivided form. On the 
plausible assumption that the perceiving subject has the ability to take sensory data 
provided discretely through each of the external senses and gather them together to 
form a unified image out of them (see below), the actually indivisible quantity would 
be potentially present in this unified image. For instance, it would be possible to dif-
ferentiate between Callias and the column he is standing next to in the Agora by per-
ceiving the respective shape belonging to each of those things. The shape, a limited 
magnitude, is an actually indivisible quantity, which would now make the image an 
object of the intellect once its activity is turned towards it. Similarly, the unity of the 
image (of Callias, say), that is, the fact of the image’s being numerically one thing 
and quantitatively distinguishable from another thing, could provide the basis for the 
undivided form. This, I think, would constitute an acceptable explanation of Aris-
totle’s claim. Notice how it is the common objects of shape and unity that provide the 
potential inherent in the image to become an object of nous. It would appear that even 
though sensible qualities are the proper objects of the external senses and stimulate 
them first and foremost, it is the quantitative attributes of the image that provide the 
intellect with the best opportunity to be stimulated by its indivisible objects. Aris-
                                       
 31. ARISTOTLE does attenuate this statement by saying “as it seems” (hôs dokei). This qualification opens the 
door to at least one thing existing without a magnitude, likely the entity described as unmoved mover in 
Physics VIII and then as divine intellect in Metaphysics XII. 
 32. One could also add PN 449b31-450a10. 
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totle’s emphasis on magnitude now becomes comprehensible, for it is the shape lim-
iting the magnitude and the fact of it being one in number that help us perceive a 
thing as a whole.33 Of course, it must not be forgotten that the intellect must some-
how act on the image, or perceive the unity of the image, so that the essence, which is 
only potentially present in the image, becomes actually known to the intellect. 
Nonetheless, an explanation along these lines does lend credence to Aristotle’s view 
expressed in II 19, 100a16-b1. 
We are now ready to tackle the third and final point, namely that the individual 
substance perceived as a whole, that is, from the perspective of its universal essential 
nature, is the main object of sense-perception, which is the joint activity of the intel-
lect and the sense capacities. So far, we have seen that Aristotle acknowledges three 
perceptible objects. Two of them, the proper and common, are essentially perceptible 
to the external senses. The third is accidentally perceptible to the external senses but 
essentially perceptible to the intellect. By means of the first two objects, we gain a 
perception of the appearances of things ; by means of the third, we gain a perception 
of their substantial natures or essences. A difficulty must be noted at this point : if, as 
I maintain, perception is of the thing perceived as a whole and not of its phenomenal 
aspect only, then how can there even be a perception of the whole thing if we per-
ceive it through two distinct perceptual capacities ? In other words, is it possible for 
the intellect and the external senses to operate together in the act of perception ? If 
this is not possible, then we have the problem of figuring out how the intellect, which 
knows a given essence, can help us know that it is the essence that belongs to a given 
image formed by the external senses (or other sense capacities such as imagination or 
memory, which can retain perceived images). Obviously, an examination of the ob-
jects of perception alone is not sufficient to provide an explanation of how human 
beings can perceive and think about things ; or how they can acquire scientific 
knowledge and understanding of them. For a complete explanation, it would be nec-
essary to add an examination of the cognitive abilities and activities of the perceiving 
and thinking subject. Such an examination is beyond the scope of this paper which is 
focused on objects of perception. However, I would like to mention briefly a few of 
the more important elements that must be included in any attempt at constructing 
Aristotle’s account of the unity of the cognitive faculties and activities based on 
relevant passages in DA and PN. 
One principle that must guide such an account is the object (to antikeime-
non)/activity (energeia)/capacity (dunamis) relation succinctly stated in DA II 4, 
415a14-22. Following this theoretical schema, the perceptual capacity is to be known 
through the acts of perception ; and the acts are to be known through the objects of 
perception. A closely related Aristotelian principle is the identity of the object and the 
activity of a cognitive faculty, which is outlined in DA III 2, 425b26-426a26. The ac-
count presented above regarding the objects of perception would thus constitute the 
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first step in the elaboration of acts and capacities of perception if we follow this 
schema.34 
Another guiding principle to be included in any account of the percipient’s cog-
nitive activities would be the relationship among capacity, state, and activity. There is 
a tradition in the history of Aristotelian commentary that sees the value in using the 
cluster of concepts capacity/state/activity to understand the activity of the intellect.35 
In II 19, sense-perception is said to be a capacity that develops into a state of pos-
sessing universals by perceiving the universal in many particular instances. Following 
the capacity/state relation, this suggests that nous is nothing other than developed and 
stable aisthêsis. Hamlyn sees (correctly I think) a similarity with states of character 
and draws a parallel between the acquisition of the principles of science and the ori-
gins of moral virtues through habituation : just as one becomes just or temperate by 
doing just or temperate acts, likewise one would acquire the ability to perceive the 
universal man by perceiving individual human beings.36 In other words, what in the 
realm of moral development is called ‘habituation’, in the intellectual realm, is called 
‘induction’ when the intellectual capacity that is being developed is the perceptual 
one belonging to nous whenever its activity is turned towards sensible particulars ; 
and a sign of this capacity’s having been developed into a state is the ability a person 
has to provide on their own ostensive definitions of things, that is, she is able to select 
instances of the essence in question, thereby showing that she has acquired the uni-
versal as it is better known to us. In short, the developed state and the activity 
springing from it are identical to the successful acquisition of the universal object.37 
DA II 5, with its division into three levels of potentiality and actuality when applied 
to cognitive capacities, could also be of some service in the elaboration of this point. 
A key passage that would have to be considered on the matter of the joint activity 
of the intellect and the senses is DA III 4, 429b10-22 in spite of its lack of clarity.38 
                                       
 34. MODRAK, Power of Perception, p. 29-32, includes these views under what she calls the “Actuality Princi-
ple,” one of five foundational principles which, she claims, “determine the character of Aristotle’s analysis 
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 35. Without endorsing any of their analyses, one can see, for example, ALEXANDER, Alexandri Aphrodisiensis 
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I. BRUNS, ed., Berlin, 1887, p. 81,22-91,6 and 106,18-113,24 ; and THEMISTIUS, In Libros Aristotelis De 
Anima Paraphrasis (CAG 5,3), R. HEINZE, ed., Berlin, 1899, p. 95,9-34 and 98,12-102,29. 
 36. D.W. HAMLYN, “Aristotelian epagôgê”, Phronesis, 21 (1976), p. 167-184. Compare ARISTOTLE’s remarks 
concerning nous and aisthêsis at Nicomachean Ethics VI 11, 1143a35-b5 and VI 8, 1142a20-30. 
 37. This is my explanation of the nous/epagôgê relationship. In short, there can never be any inductive activity 
without nous being involved because this cognitive process describes one of its intellectual activities : that 
of perceiving the universality of the particular (instance). Just as seeing is the activity of the eyes and its 
power of sight, ‘inducing’ is the activity of the intellect while it exercises its perceptual function. And this 
intellectual function requires simultaneous functioning of sensory powers (the next point to be considered). 
For somewhat similar explanations, cf. KOSMAN, “Understanding, Explanation, and Insight”, in LEE, 
MOURELATOS, RORTY, ed., Exegesis and Argument, p. 390 ; and LESHER, “The Meaning of NOUS”, p. 58. 
 38. This is a difficult passage to interpret and has given rise to much disagreement among scholars. The sub-
ject of the acts of discrimination discussed in it is not always clear. Is it the senses, the intellect, or the hu-
man subject possessed of both ? And if it is the person, is she using only one of the capacities in two dif-
ferent ways ? Or using both, one for each kind of object ? Furthermore, the simile of the line being at one 
time straight and at another time bent or broken is not helpful since it is not clear what cognitive power  
ARISTOTLE’S ANALYSIS OF PERCEPTION 
29 
Aristotle’s aim in this passage is to show how water and “what it is to be” (ti ên 
einai) water are “discriminated by something different or by the same thing differ-
ently disposed” (ê allôi ê allôs echonti krinei). Even though it is not clear what ca-
pacity is being referred to, to my mind, there are three logically possible ways of un-
derstanding his intent : (1) since the passage is included in a chapter concerned with 
the intellect, and since (the sensible qualities of) water is perceived by the (external) 
senses, then Aristotle is possibly saying that intellect is the “something different” 
which perceives the ‘what it is to be’ of water ; or (2) he could be saying that the in-
tellect perceives the essence of water, which is the intelligible object proper to the 
intellect, but then it is differently disposed whenever it perceives the essence in the 
image ; disposed in this other way, the intellect is able to perceive water’s sensible 
qualities as well ; or (3) since in line 429b15 there is explicit mention of the faculty of 
sense-perception discriminating (tôi aisthêtikôi krinei) something, he could be saying 
instead that the sense capacity perceives water, but it is then differently disposed 
whenever the intellect acts on it — perhaps like light illuminating the image of wa-
ter ; and disposed in this way, the senses are able to perceive the essence of water. 
The context of the passage as well as the reference to nous at the end of it (in 
line 429b22) would make (1) or (2) more likely than (3). Be that as it may, each one 
of these readings shows that for Aristotle, the senses and intellect must work together 
in some way ; and any one of these readings, if interpreted with clarity, could de-
scribe how this joint operation occurs.39 
Another point that would have to be established, closely related to the previous 
one, is that the act of perception involves the discrimination of the various perceptual 
capacities working together. In DA III 1, 425a14-b11, Aristotle has some thoughts 
about how the external senses and the common sense discriminate among all the 
various proper and common objects. In III 2, 426b8-427a16, we find his view that 
that which discriminates among categorically different sensible objects like sweet 
(flavour) and white (colour) is something unified like a point, being both indivisible 
and divisible. The same idea is found in III 7, 431a21-b1 where he says that that 
which judges or determines the difference between sweet and hot is one as a bound-
ary is one. The most important leitmotif running throughout these passages is that the 
(external) senses are capable of such acts of discrimination “not in so far as they are 
themselves but in so far as they form a unity, when sense-perception simultaneously 
takes place in respect of the same object, e.g. in respect of bile that it is bitter and 
                                       
each kind of line represents. The reader would do well to first consult HICKS, De Anima, p. 485-493, and 
RODIER, Traité de l’âme, p. 442-453, who both provide the views of several commentators, including the 
ancient commentators. 
 39. Reading 1, albeit with a slight variation, would be exemplified by ROSS, De Anima, p. 40-41, who tenta-
tively speculates “that it is the soul that apprehends both concrete things and abstractions, but the former 
qua perceptive, the latter qua cognitive.” Reading 2 would be the most compatible with my views pre-
sented above regarding the intellect’s perception of the form in the image. It is supported by HICKS, 
De Anima, p. 485-488, who argues that ultimately, intellect judges both the forms and the sensible thing 
because there are many considerations which favour the view that intellect is sense in a different relation. 
He also wisely suggests the passage will be easier to understand if “a hard and fast distinction” between the 
sensitive and intellective faculties is not maintained. 
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yellow… (ouch hêi autai, all’ hêi mia, hotan hama genêtai hê aisthêsis epi tou autou) 
(DA III 1, 425a30-b3 ; emphasis added). In other words, it is the indivisible meta-
physical unity of the individual substance stimulating all (or several) external senses 
at the same time (hama) that causes the unity of the image to be formed within the 
percipient. Add to this point Aristotle’s views regarding the dependence of imagina-
tion and memory on sense-perception40 as well as the intellect’s dependence on sen-
sory images for its activity, it becomes plausible to see that sense-perception is in fact 
of the individual thing because its sensible qualities, quantitative attributes, and sub-
stantial nature can simultaneously stimulate all of the percipient’s capacities involved 
in the perception of it.41 
In short, it is the unity of the individual substance that guarantees the unity of the 
act of perception in the perceiving subject. As a consequence, the simultaneous ac-
tivity of the senses and intellect enables human beings to perceive the thing. How-
ever, since the intellect is the highest cognitive capacity involved in perception, and 
since its object is the essence, therefore, what is ultimately perceived is the individual 
thing perceived as a whole (katholou = kata + holon) and in its essential universality. 
In other words, even though perception is initially determined by the external senses 
taken as the standard and the mind’s attention is first drawn to their perceptible ob-
jects, an inversion occurs and the mind’s attention is then drawn to the intellect’s per-
ceptible object because the intellect has become the standard of perception. Thus, the 
individual substance initially perceived in its sensible particularity is ultimately per-
ceived in its essential universality. What is really perceived is not the whole individ-
ual thing (its sensible qualities, quantitative attributes, and essence), but rather, the 
individual thing perceived as a whole, which means perceiving it in its essential uni-
versality. As Aristotle carefully asserts in his example, what is perceived is Callias as 
(an instance of) man (that is, the individual thing as a whole), not Callias the man 
(that is, the whole individual thing). Thus, the complete answer to Hicks’ question is 
that the essence of the individual thing is the object of perception. Hence Aristotle’s 
elliptic explanation : for though the act of perception is of the particular, the capacity 
is of the universal and so is the object gained ; for the universal substance is in the 
particular substance.42 
                                       
 40. For imagination, see DA III 3, 428b10-17 ; for memory, see PN 1, 451a15-18. 
 41. Philopon (cited in HICKS, De Anima, p. 432) argues the fact of one act of perception (mia aesthêsis) from 
the simultaneity (hama) of stimulation of the senses. MODRAK, Power of Perception, p. 31, expresses a 
similar thought, except without emphasizing the unity of the sense experience, when she writes : “The 
epistemological priority of the object is due to its ontological priority. When a person tastes something 
salty, for instance, the characteristics of the salt determine the characteristics of the event of tasting in 
which the sense is exercised.” 
 42. Thus, I think there is enough textual evidence showing that Aristotle did have an answer to how perception 
and induction of the universal can occur to lay Barnes’ objection raised at the outset to rest. For a fuller ac-
count of how the senses can operate jointly with the intellect in sense-perception, see my Aristotle Poste-
rior Analytics II.19 : Introduction, Greek Text, Translation and Commentary Accompanied by a Critical 
Analysis, Québec, PUL, 2004, p. 173-189 and 211-226. 
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CONCLUSION : POST-ARISTOTLE 
My claim is that Aristotle’s remark about sense-perception being of the universal 
reflects his view that human perception is holistic, is of the universal in the sensible 
particular. Aristotle’s metaphysical doctrine means that individual substances are 
primary and are what really exist. As a result, it is the unity of the individual sub-
stance that guarantees the unity of the act of perception taking place in the percipient. 
However, when it comes to explaining our perception of such substances, Aristotle’s 
analytical method leads him to divide the holistic act of perception according to ob-
jects of perception. Starting with the external senses as the standard to determine 
what these objects are, Aristotle holds that the proper and common objects are essen-
tially perceptible while the universal essence is accidentally perceptible. In order to 
complete the analysis, Aristotle shifts the standard to the intellect and maintains that 
the essence is essentially perceptible to it, the other two objects now becoming acci-
dentally perceptible. And whenever the intellect perceives the essential nature in the 
sensible appearance, it becomes possible for him to say that perception is of things 
perceived in their essential universality, and not merely of their phenomenal aspect. 
As for the consequences of these views for Post An II 19, it must be seen that in-
duction through sense-perception is successful whenever we can perceive individual 
substances in their essential universality and not in their sensible particularity. This 
kind of perception is at the root of the development of the noetic state of possessing 
the principles of science, a development made possible by the shift in the mind’s at-
tention from the external senses to the intellect as the standard of perception. Fur-
thermore, the development of the noetic state must respect the difference between 
that which is more familiar to us and that which is more familiar in an absolute 
sense ; and as described above, the former indemonstrable kind of understanding 
grounds the latter understanding which is rational and can include demonstration. 
Finally, to conclude my brief comments made in the first section on the historical 
context of Aristotle, after Aristotle the Stoics, Epicureans, and other Hellenistic 
schools adopt philosophical views that, in the words of Inwood and Gerson, are rather 
“materialist” and “empiricist.”43 Generally speaking, there is a rejection of Aristotle’s 
doctrine of substance and form and any other incorporeal entities present in his phi-
losophy (and Plato’s, too). And although Aristotle is an empiricist — as evidenced by 
his views on induction from sense-perception as the source of scientific principles — 
the Hellenistic schools adopt a more “thorough-going” empiricism that rejects Aris-
totle’s inductive process while maintaining the broader belief that there is nothing in 
the mind which was not previously in the senses. Inwood and Gerson perspicaciously 
speculate : “It is tempting to see one stimulus for the rise of skepticism in the rigour 
of Hellenistic empiricism” (p. XVII). Rigorous, indeed ! — For they rejected the in-
tellectual perception of the non-sensible universal in the sensible particular, which is 
the very essence of the inductive process as Aristotle understood it. With Plotinus and 
                                       
 43. Brad INWOOD, Lloyd P. GERSON, trans., Hellenistic Philosophy : Introductory Readings, Second edition, 
Indianapolis, Hackett, 1997, p. XVI-XVII. 
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the Neoplatonists some Greek philosophers revert to the Platonic epistemology and 
metaphysics, with the concomitant duality of the sensible realm perceptible to the 
senses and the intelligible realm of Forms knowable to the intellect. As a conse-
quence, Aristotle’s account in Post An II 19 turns out to be the only attempt in the 
history of Greek philosophy to place so much faith in the sense-perception of ‘em-
pirical’ reality as a source of knowledge and the foundation of scientific explanation. 
